This study examines CEO compensation in family firms, with a particular focus on the effects exerted by governance characteristics such as ownership concentration, wedge between voting and cash-flow rights rights, and the presence of shareholder agreements. On a sample of Italian-listed companies over the period 1998-2002, we provide empirical evidence that family firms pay CEOs systematically more then other firms, and that the ownership structure exerts a significant effect on CEO compensation. In family firms, CEO pay is indeed positively affected by low ownership concentration, as well as a low wedge between voting and cash flow rights. Moreover, the presence of shareholders agreements has a moderating role on the level of CEO compensation. These effects are more pronounced in family than in non-family firms. The analysis of the relationship between excess compensation and future firm performance reveals that the higher compensation granted to the CEO by family firms is related to worse stock and accounting returns and could therefore be interpreted as a form of rent extraction. This result holds only for lower degrees of ownership concentration, higher wedge, and in absence of shareholder agreements, and supports the hypothesis that the prevalent agency conflict within Italian-listed family firms is between family owners and minority shareholders, instead of between shareholders and managers. The higher compensation granted to the CEO could be the premium for the loyalty of the CEO to the family and for allowing the family to extract private benefits of control.
Introduction
The effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive compensation has received a considerable attention from the recent literature (for a survey see Devers et al., 2007) .
Most of these studies are based on the model of the widely-held firm, where shares are dispersed among a vast plethora of investors and the ownership of the firm cannot be associated with a single person or a restricted group of owners. Within these firms, the main agency problem is that of the alignment of the different interests of shareholders who own the firm and those of the managers who control it, where CEO compensation is aimed at overcoming this agency problem.
However, the dominant governance model outside the US, and especially in Continental Europe, is represented by family firms, namely companies owned and often managed by its founder or heirs. The different nature of firm ownership leads to substantial differences in the nature of the agency problem. As argued by Bebchuk et al. (2000) and Morck et al. (2000) , while the main agency problem in the widely-held firm involves managers not acting for shareholders' interests, agency problems in family firms involve managers acting solely for only one shareholder, the ultimate owner, and neglecting minority shareholders. CEO compensation in family firms is expected to reflect these differences and is therefore worthy of study with respect to CEO pay and its design.
Despite its relevance, only a few papers focus on CEO compensation in family firms. In this study we contribute to fill this gap through the analysis of cash-based CEO compensation within family firms on a sample of Italian-listed companies over the period 1998-2002. We assume that in family firms the CEO acts primarily as an agent of the family, and that his compensation is related to the incentives the family obtains from expropriating minority shareholders. In order to explore this issue, we study the differences between family and non-family-owned firms, relating also CEO compensation to proxies for the incentives the family has to extract private benefits of control, such as ownership concentration, the degree of wedge between voting rights and cash-flow rights, and the existence of shareholder agreements.
A key factor in our analysis is that we test the nature of excess compensation eventually granted to the CEO, by distinguishing between the exploitation hypothesis -namely the extraction of an extra rent by the CEO at the expense of shareholders -from the case of higher compensation related to the specific characteristics of the firm that require higher quality CEO. This analysis is based on the observation of the impact on firm market and accounting performance of CEO of excess compensation.
Our findings suggest that family firms pay their CEO more than non-family firms.
Moreover, in family firms CEO compensation is positively affected by low ownership concentration, as well as a low wedge between voting and cash flow rights, while the presence of shareholder agreements contributes to limit the amount of pay granted to the CEO.
The analysis of the relationship between excess compensation and future firm performance reveals that the higher compensation granted to the CEO by family firms is related to worse stock and accounting returns, which could be interpreted as a form of rent extraction. This result holds only for lower degrees of ownership concentration and a higher wedge, and supports the hypothesis that the prevalent agency conflict within Italian-listed family firms is between family owners and minority shareholders, instead of between shareholders and managers. The higher compensation granted to the CEO could be the premium for the loyalty of the CEO to the family and for allowing the family to extract private benefits of control.
Furthermore, excess compensation is related to lower firm future performance only if shareholders' agreements are not in place. According to previous results on CEO cash compensation, coalition could improve performance, also preventing family CEOs from extracting private benefits form minority shareholders through excess compensation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the prior literature, the contribution of the paper, and the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and methodology, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
Literature review, hypotheses, and contribution

Literature
A non-trivial part of the world economy is run through family firms, namely firms owned by the founder and/or his heirs. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) document that most of large firms in non-Anglo-Saxon countries are organized into business groups controlled by a few wealthy families. These findings are confirmed by other studies: Barca and Becht (2001) ) and Faccio and Lang (2002) describe concentrated corporate control in the hands of a few leading families throughout Continental European countries. Similar results are found by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) for Asia. Even in the US, where the model of large, widely-held firms is dominant, family-owned businesses account for 40 to 60 percent of gross national product and employ almost 80 percent of the workforce (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2001) .
Nonetheless, executive compensation has been extensively analyzed in the literature mainly with respect to widely-held firms. Only little attention has been devoted to executive pay in family-owned firms, although the two types of ownership have substantial differences in terms of agency relationship.
Within widely-held firms, where shares are dispersed among a large number of investors and the ownership of the firm cannot be associated with a single person or a restricted group of owners, the main agency problem is to address the manager's behaviour toward the maximization of shareholders' wealth, instead of his own welfare (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
When the firm is family-owned, this kind of agency problem is softened, mainly by the high ownership concentration associated with family firms. As pointed out by Dyl (1988) with respect to closely-held firms, the large investment of controlling shareholder's wealth within the firm creates the incentives to carefully scrutinize the management actions, whereas in widely-held firms no individual shareholder is likely to have a sufficient incentive to engage in such monitoring activity (free-riding problem).
As a consequence, within family firms it is unlikely that the manager acts in his own interest at the expense of the family; more likely, the manager will effectively act as an agent, even if his principal are not the shareholders as a whole, but instead the family in control. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued, the fundamental agency problem is not the conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather the conflict between outside investors and controlling shareholders.
Moving from this premise, the ultimate aim inspiring the presence of the family within the firm is crucial, not only with respect to the value of the firm, but also to the CEO compensation.
In general, family shareholders should have strong incentives to maximize the value of the firm, either because they want to preserve the family's reputation, strictly related to the destiny of the firm that often bears the family's name (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Dyer and Whetten, 2006) , as well as because they want to pass the firm to the family's next generation (Casson, 1999; James, 1999) . If this aim is prevailing, we expect that CEO compensation is set at an efficient level, namely a level that not exceed the minimum amount of pay at which the CEO is willing to accept the job (CEO's reservation constraint).
However, as highlighted by Chrisman et al. (2004) and Bertrand and Schoar (2006) , family ties could lead to reshape the order of priorities assigned to the firm, so that the satisfaction of the family's utility function could become the prevalent aim. In some cases, the private benefits gained by the family don't hurt the value of the firm 1 . In other circumstances, they reduce the market value of the firm, and then the consumption of the private benefits of control takes place at expense of minority shareholders.
Within this perspective, the family and the manager could find profitable to collude in expropriating minority shareholders and sharing the benefits between them (Burkart et al., 2003) . As a result, the CEO could be granted with extra compensation as the premium for the loyalty to the family in control and as a stake of the private benefits extracted. Moreover, when the CEO is also the owner of the firm, the larger compensation could be related to his power to require and obtain inflated pay .
The expropriation of minority shareholders can take a variety of forms. In general, the most common way is "tunnelling", namely transactions where a company that a shareholder controls sells at below the market prices products, assets, financial resources or investment opportunities to companies in which the same shareholder owns a larger share of cash flow rights (Johnson et al., 2000) . In these cases, the differential between the market price and the effective price of the transaction is not shared among all the shareholders in proportion of the shares owned, but determines a wealth transfer to the party in control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) .
When a firm is family-owned the private benefits of control could be larger, given that the firm becomes the mean for satisfying the "altruism" that characterizes the relationship among family members, leading to family-firm specific agency costs. As defined by Schultze et al. (2001) , altruism makes it possible for the owner to increase his own welfare by being generous with the other members of the family at the expense of firm value. The agency costs of altruism can take the form of privileges that family members would not receive if they were employed outside the family firm, such as secure employment, higher compensation, consumption of perquisites, as well as the entrenchment of the inept or ineffective owner-CEO, due to the indulgence of the other members of the family 2 . Existent literature provides empirical evidence on the benefits perceived by family members within family-owned companies: Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2001) find that executives with family ties to the firm's owners are more entrenched in their role, with a weaker relationship between executive tenure and firm's performance. Anderson and Reeb (2004) cite cases of diverted firm assets to the private use of the family in control, while Cohen and Lauterbach (2008) find that when the CEO belongs to the family he is paid on average more then non-family CEO.
Hypotheses development
The wider spectrum of private benefits of control associated with family ownership is expected to impact positively on CEO compensation. The CEO is appointed by the family in order to serve its own interests, and his compensation is comprehensive of a stake of the private benefits that the family obtains through the control. We then formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: CEO compensation is higher in family firms than in non-family firms.
The empirical evidence on this point is mixed. On a sample of German firms, Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) found a positive impact of family ownership on CEO compensation, while Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2000) find that family-owned US firms pay the CEO the less.
However, as outlined above, the decision to extract private benefits could be influenced by the ownership structure of the firm. The incentives to expropriate minority shareholders increase as the ownership of cash flows decreases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1999) , as well as in presence of control enhancing devices, such as pyramidal groups, multiple control chains, cross holdings, and dual class shares Faccio and Lang, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003) . In these circumstances, the expropriation of minority shareholders is more profitable, as well as the stake of these benefits shared with the CEO in form of higher compensation (2000), when in closelyheld firms the control is obtained by a coalition, the power of the controlling shareholders is reduced as well as the incentives to extract private benefits. Moreover, Maury and Pajuste (2005) , on a sample of Finnish listed firms, find that especially in 3 Several papers provide empirical evidence that the share ownership of the largest shareholder is negatively related to the level of compensation: Dyl (1988) , Core et al. (1999) , Kraft and Niederprum (1999) , Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2000) , Cyert et al. (2002) for US firms. The same result is found by Fitzroy and Schwalbach (1990) , Schmid (1997) , and Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) for samples of German firms. As for wedge, existing literature focused on the effect that the wedge between cash flow and voting rights exerts on firm value (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; Volpin, 2002; Barontini and Siciliano, 2003) , while only little attention has been devoted to explore the effect on CEO compensation. At our knowledge, only the paper of Masulis et al. (2008) considers this issue, finding that CEO pay is significantly higher for companies where the insider control-cash flow rights divergence is larger. 4 See the Report commissioned by the European Commission: Reoprt an the proportionality principle in the Europen Union (2007).
family-controlled firms the presence of other strong blockholders limits the incentive to expropriation.
For Italy, Gianfrate (2007) finds that, in absolute terms, the adoption of a shareholders' agreement lead to negative abnormal returns. However, Volpin (2002) points out that, compared to the situation where the control is fully in the hands of a single controlling shareholder, the control obtained through a shareholders' agreement leads to better governance, as measured in terms of firm value and of sensitivity of manager turnover to performance. According to this view, Bossi and Giudici (2006) show that the announcement of a shareholders' agreement has more likely a positive effect when the largest shareholder in the agreement is a family member.
Moving from these premises, we expect that in a family firm, if the control is obtained through a shareholders agreement, the family is less free to extract private benefits, as well as to redistribute them in form of higher CEO compensation.
We then summarize the expected results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The difference in CEO compensation between family and non-family firms is larger:
-when the family ownership is low;
-when the wedge between cash flow and control rights is high;
-in absence of shareholders' agreements;
Finally, if the premium granted to the CEO is mainly addressed not to improve firm performance but instead to maximize the family's private wealth, we expect a negative impact of CEO's excess-compensation on future firm performance.
Hypothesis 3: The excess-compensation granted to the CEO by family firms negatively affects future firm performance.
The same issue has been raised by Barak, Cohen and Lauterbach (2008) by studying the effect of CEO excess compensation on the value of closely-held public-traded firms.
Their results show that excess compensation granted to the owner-CEO has a negative impact, corroborating the idea that high family-CEO pay is a form of private benefit at the expense of shareholders.
As a further step in this direction, we relate the effect of excess compensation on firm performance to the incentives the family has to extract private benefits of control and, according to their disciplining role, to the absence of shareholders' agreements. We then formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: In family firms, the impact of excess-compensation granted to the CEO on future firm performance is negative when the family's ownership is low, the wedge is high, and in absence of shareholder agreements.
Contribution
In Barontini and Bozzi (2009), we analysed the relationship among corporate ownership, the level of Board compensation, and firm's future performance.
In this paper we apply the same scheme of research to the study of CEO pay within family firms. For the first time, CEO compensation within family firms is related not only to the degree of ownership concentration, but also to the degree of wedge, i.e. the difference between cash flow and voting rights that measures the separation between ownership and control, and to the existence of shareholders' agreements, a very common feature within Italian-listed firms, where the ultimate shareholder is supported by a coalition of blockholders (Bianchi and Bianco, 2008) . We are not aware of other papers that directly explore the impact of shareholder agreements on the level of CEO compensation.
Moreover, by interacting excess compensation with future firm performance, we test the hypothesis of expropriation of minority shareholders, contrasted to the hypothesis of high CEO compensation due to unobservable variables.
Furthermore, the study provides empirical evidence on CEO compensation with respect to a large sample of companies listed on the Italian stock market. In Italy, the corporate governance of listed firms is substantially different from that of Anglo-Saxon companies, to which most studies on CEO compensation refer to, and at the same time is highly representative of the governance characteristics of listed firms in most of the 
Data and Methodology
Data on executive compensation
Our study benefits from a unique database on CEO compensation over the period 1998 In order to study the annual executive compensation, we use the variable Refined Other
Compensation, namely the item Other Compensation net of components that are credits of the director, accrued in previous years (indemnity) or in current year (reimbursement of expenses), compensation received for consulting services provided to the firm, and compensation returned to the company. We include, however, the other components such as the Executive Committee Participation Fee, compensation the executive perceives as an employee of the company, and compensation granted by participated companies.
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Among these components, the most relevant one for our analysis is probably the "Compensation granted by participated companies". We included this component into CEO Total Compensation moving from the premise that, especially in family groups, the compensation is set considering all the sources of payment, regardless of whether they are provided by the parent company or by controlled companies (often unlisted). In this perspective, compensation provided by controlled companies cannot be discriminated in respect to that paid by the parent company. Moreover, if this component were not included in CEO compensation, the link between company performance, measured in terms of consolidated data, and executive compensation would be partially hidden.
Ownership variables
In this study we relate the level of CEO compensation to ownership structure variables, such as ownership compensation, the degree of wedge, and the presence of shareholders' agreements.
In order to detect the identity of the ultimate shareholder and the size of its cash flow and voting rights, we use the standard approach developed by La Porta et al. (1999) , and followed, among the others, by Faccio and Lang (2002) . Looking at data available on "Taccuino dell'Azionista", "Calepino dell'azionista", and information disclosed by 
Control variables
In our analysis of CEO compensation in family firms we control for a set of variables that previous studies found to be relevant for the level of CEO pay, such as firm size, performance, growth opportunities and complexity, risk, and the presence of stock-7 Since 1998 the disclosure of shareholders' agreement characteristics is imposed to every listed company. 8 The most frequent types of shareholders' agreement are "voting" (participants are committed to meet before any shareholders' meeting and to reach a binding decision about the way of exercising their voting rights) "consulting" (Participants are committed to consult among themselves, in order to possibly reach a common way of voting in shareholders' meetings), "board composition" (each participant is given the right to appoint a number of Directors), "transfer restriction" (trades on shares involved in the agreement are restricted).
option plans. We also include a set of dummy variables for industry and year fixed effects.
As for firm size, Rosen (1982) predicts that larger firms require more talented and more costly management. Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) document that larger firms, in terms of net sales, pay their executives more, although Murphy (1999) shows that the explanatory power of firm sales has declined over time. On the contrary, Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that firm size is the single most important variable in explaining the level of CEO compensation. We then expect a positive association between firm size and the level of CEO compensation. As a proxy for firm size we use the Log of Total Asset (LSize).
Firm performance is expected to positively affect CEO compensation, as reported by Kaplan (1994) and Murphy (1985) . As performance variables, we consider contemporaneous and lagged stock market returns (RETURN t and RETURN t-1 , respectively), as well as contemporaneous and lagged accounting Return on Assets (ROA t and ROA t-1 , respectively) defined as the ratio between operating profit and total assets.
Moreover, following Smith and Watts (1992) , we expect complexity of operations and growth opportunities to be positively related to the level of executive pay. As a proxy for these variables we adopt Tobin's Q (LQ):
€ LQ = Book value of total assets -Book value of shareholders' equity + Market value of shareholders' equity Book value of total assets Under a theoretical perspective, the level of executive compensation may either increase or decrease with firm risk (Banker and Datar, 1989) . Cyert et al. (1997) , consistently with standard agency theory, document positive associations between CEO compensation and firm risk. On the contrary, Core et al. (1999) found that the level of CEO total compensation is negatively related to firm risk. 9 As firm risk measure we adopt the standard deviation of stock returns (STD) computed over the previous 256 days. 10 In order to test if stock-based compensation is a supplement or a substitute for base salary, we include a dummy variable for the existence of stock option plans (ST_OP). A negative correlation between total compensation and the existence of a stock option plan will be consistent with a substitution effect, and an incentive role on management behaviour within the 'optimal contracts' model (Bebchuk et al., 2001 ); a positive correlation would signal that stock options are used to further increase high cash compensation and (perhaps) to extract rents from shareholders.
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When the CEO holds also the role of chair, the board's ability to monitor the management could be reduced, increasing agency cost (Jensen, 1993, and Core et al., 1999) . In this paper we don't examine the large literature on the effect of CEO duality on performance; 12 however, we expect that, according to previous studies (Cyert et al., 2002) , CEO compensation is higher when the CEO also chairs the board. We define therefore the dummy variable DUAL that takes the value 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the board.
We control also for the participation of CEO to committees through the dummy variable Committee, and for the variable 2nd Sh that captures the share ownership of the second largest shareholder.
Finally, we include the log of size of the board (LBsize) as a governance control variable.
Since business cycle and industry unobservable characteristics could be related to executive pay, we use fixed effect specifications in panel data regression by including year and industry dummy variables. For industry effects, we use 15 dummy variables based on the Campbell (1996) classification.
Accounting returns, as well as other accounting information, are supplied by Worldscope, while market returns are collected from Datastream. Table 1 summarize the meaning and notation of variables. 10 We also considered stock Beta as a measure of firm risk, but results did not change significantly. However, since the CEO can hardly diversify the risk of the firm, the standard deviation of returns is a more appropriate risk measure. 11 We decided to ignore information on the value of stock option grants since data provided by Italian companies over the 1998 -2002 period are not detailed and, as a consequence, the valuation of executive's stock option portfolio not reliable. 12 For a recent survey, see Fahlenbrach (2009) .
Methodology
We analyze the characteristics of CEO compensation within family firms through a set of panel data regressions, described by the following general equation:
TOTComp it is the amount of CEO cash compensation, while FamVar is a set of family specific variables, such as the family nature of ownership (Family) . is a vector of control variables, as described in the previous section, including also a set of dummy variables (Year) for 1995 -2002 years, and a set of industry dummy variables for the sector of activity (Industry).
Within the analysis we focus in particular on family variables, as well as with other corporate governance variables such as the ownership concentration, the degree of wedge, and the presence of shareholders' agreements.
As a further step of the analysis we test whether the compensation granted to the CEO is "adequate", or alternatively, it is a form of rent extracted by the CEO through excess compensation (Core et al., 1999; Hayes and Schaefer, 2000) . Following the approach of Ang et al. (2003) , Brick et al. (2006) and Barak, Cohen and Lauterbach (2008) , we first estimate "predicted" compensation as the amount that the firm should grant in equilibrium. Predicted compensation is obtained by regressing the log of CEO cash pay on proxies for its "economic" determinants, as specified by previous research in this area (Smith and Watts, 1992; Rosen, 1982; Core, 1997) : firm size, risk, contemporaneous and lagged performance, and investment opportunities. Moreover, we control for the presence of a second large shareholder, CEO committee participation and CEO/Chair duality, other than year and industry fixed effect. The regression is specified by the following equation:
The residuals ε it of the regression provide the estimate of "excess compensation"
granted to the CEO of firm i in each of the years t within the sample period, as the difference between the CEO compensation granted by firm i in year t and "predicted" compensation, as stemming from the application of equation (2) parameters to firm i. 
Specifically, we first interact the residuals (ExeComp) with the dummy for the family nature of the firm (Family), ownership concentration (respectively O_Low and O_High for increasing degree of concentration) and wedge (respectively W_Low and W_High for increasing degree of wedge) ), and the dummy for the presence of shareholders' agreements.
A negative coefficient associated with the residuals indicates that the extra pay to the CEO is related to lower firm performance, and thus should be considered excessive compensation granted to the CEO. On the contrary, a positive coefficient indicates that the extra pay is related to unobserved firm complexity (i.e., an omitted variable problem), for example the need for the firm to hire managers with higher skills with higher pay expectations. First, family firms account for more than half of the listed companies in the sample, confirming the dominance of a family-based ownership in Italy.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Mean total compensation is similar among family and non-family firms, even if median values are significantly lower for the former. then revealing the presence of a rightskewed distribution, with some very high CEO compensation for a few family firms.
Not surprisingly, family firms are smaller in terms of total assets (Size); exhibit higher accounting returns (ROA) and higher market risk (STD), although market performance (Return) and value (LQ) are not statistically different from non-family firms.
As expected, stock options are more frequently used in non-family firms (ST_OP), that also are characterized by larger boards (LBsize) and higher frequency of shareholders' agreements (SA). On the other hand, family firms show a higher ownership concentration, both in terms of cash flow rights (O) and voting rights (C). As expected, they also make more use of control-enhancing devices such as pyramidal groups and dual-class shares, as shown by the higher wedge (W) between cash flow and voting rights. We note furthermore that the voting rights of the second largest shareholder are not statistically different between family and non-family firms (2 nd Sh).
Lastly, CEO committee participation is more frequent in non family firms, while CEO/Chair duality seems not related to the nature of the ultimate owner. 
CEO compensation in family firms
The level of CEO compensation and the role of the ownership structure
As a first step in the analysis, we run different specifications of the regression described by equation (1), in order to analyse the determinants of CEO compensation and to test whether the level of CEO compensation is different in family firms compared to nonfamily firms.
The results, reported in Table III, The presence of a stock option plan is positively related to CEO cash compensation.
This result implies that stock-based compensation is not a substitute for cash compensation, but instead that it reinforces total compensation as the cash-based part of CEO pay increases. The coefficient on the wedge between voting and cash flow rights (W), contrary to expectations, is significantly negative, implying that the CEO is paid less in firms with a higher wedge. This result could appear somewhat surprising, given that one of the effects associated with the use of pyramidal groups and non-voting shares is the opportunity for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders, and larger CEO and board compensation are one of the forms of such expropriation. We further investigate this point later in this section.
The presence of shareholders' agreements, when measured on the whole sample, does not exert a significant impact on CEO compensation, as indicated by the coefficient SA,
In order to investigate the impact that ownership structure variables exert specifically in We further refine the analysis by interacting ownership concentration with the presence of shareholder agreements. The empirical results, not reported here for brevity, show that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the ownership concentration is significantly lowered in presence of shareholders' agreements, in particular for family firms.
Moreover, we separate the sample in clusters characterized by different degrees of ownership concentration, and find that the presence of shareholder agreements significantly lowers CEO compensation only within firms with low levels of ownership concentration. These results suggest that the disciplining power of shareholders' agreements on CEO pay is more effective for family firms in which the controlling shareholders owns a low fraction of cash flow rights.
With respect to wedge, instead, the coefficient in Table III is significant only at 10%;
i.e., as wedge decreases, the magnitude of the difference in CEO compensation between family and non-family firms does not vary by a very significant amount. This result is in contrast with Hypothesys 2., given that we expect a larger magnitude of the increase in CEO compensation as wedge increases.
The relationship between CEO compensation and wedge is then somewhat counterintuitive and deserves more thorough investigation.
We find that this effect is strictly related to the way CEO compensation is computed,
given that, as explained in Section 3.1, it includes not only the compensation directly granted by the firm, but also the pay the CEO receives by the controlled companies.
This implies a mechanical negative linkage between CEO compensation and the hierarchical position of a firm within the group. For example, if the same CEO serves in more than one listed company within the same family group, the family set his compensation considering all the sources of payment, regardless of whether it is provided by the parent company or by controlled companies. However, when we look at the compensation of the CEO within the different companies within the group, we detect for the same CEO higher compensation associated with the parent company (with low wedge) -given that we compute not only the compensation directly paid by the company but also that paid by the controlled companies -while we detect lower CEO compensation associated with controlled companies, i.e. companies with higher wedge.
We obtain results consistent with this interpretation by re-estimating the regressions considering only direct CEO pay, and then excluding compensation received by controlled companies. The coefficient of the wedge associated with family ownership becomes positive; however, given that it is not significant, we conclude that Hypothesis 2. is confirmed only with respect to ownership concentration and the presence of shareholders' agreements, but not with respect to wedge.
Excess compensation and firm performance
As a further step of the analysis, we relate excess compensation to future firm operating and stock performance, in order to assess the nature of the higher compensation paid by family firms to their CEOs; i.e., we empirically test whether a high compensation is a form of rent extraction at the expense of shareholders, or alternatively if it is the premium the CEOs of family firms get for the unobservable qualities required to run these kind of companies. Moreover, we relate this issue to ownership characteristics of the firm, such as ownership concentration, wedge and the presence of shareholders'
agreements.
The results of the analysis are provided in Table IV .
Table IV. Excess compensation and firm performance: Family vs. non-Family firms
The empirical evidence supports hypothesis 3 that the higher compensation granted by family firms is a form of expropriation of shareholders. The coefficient on the interaction term between excess CEO compensation and family ownership (ExcComp*Family) is negative and significant at 5%, meaning that the "premium"
granted to CEOs by family firms is negatively related to future firm performance (Section a of Table IV ). This result then discards the hypothesis that it is due to unobservable characteristics of the CEO within family firms, in favour of the expropriation hypothesis.
Moreover, we find that this effect is reinforced in the presence of those conditions that make the expropriation of minority shareholders more profitable, such as lower ownership concentration and higher wedge (Table IV , Sections b. and c.). In effect, when computed with respect to different classes of ownership and wedge (ExcComp*Family*O and ExcComp*Family*W, respectively), the coefficients are negative and highly significant for low ownership and high levels of wedge, while for non-family firms they are not significant and of a consistently lower magnitude.
A similar effect is detected with respect to shareholders' agreements (ExcComp*Family*W): excess compensation negatively affects future performance only in family firms with no shareholders' agreements, as an evidence that these arrangements limit the opportunity of the families to extract benefits in the form of higher CEO compensation.
The results reported above then strongly confirm Hypothesis 4..
Discussion and conclusion
The results of the paper provide several insights into CEO compensation within family firms.
A first result is that family firms pay their CEOs more than non-family firms, as documented by previous papers (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy, 2000; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006) .
Examining ownership characteristics of the firm, we find that, in line with the empirical evidence provided by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) , ownership concentration has a negative impact on CEO compensation. We interpret this result as a support to the hypothesis that the incentives for the family to extract private benefits and to share them with the CEO in form of higher compensation are larger when the family owns a limited stake of cash flows.
With respect to the wedge, we find a negative relationship with CEO compensation; however, this relationship becomes positive and non-significant when adjusted for compensation received by controlled companies within the family group.
Finally, we provide evidence that in presence of shareholder agreements the level of CEO compensation is significantly lower, as if the participants to the agreement exerted a monitoring role that limit the consumption of private benefits, at least in the form of higher CEO compensation
The analysis of excess compensation and its impact on future firm performance shows that the higher compensation paid to the CEO is a form of rent extraction, ruling out the alternative hypothesis of a premium due to the CEO for the higher skills required to manage a family-owned firm.
The interaction of excess compensation with governance variables reveals that the negative impact on firm performance is significant only when the ownership is low and the wedge is high. This result implies that the extra compensation paid to the manager is a form of rent extraction only when the family has more incentives to expropriate minority shareholders (low ownership concentration and high wedge), thus corroborating the idea of collusion between family and CEO in sharing the benefits of control. Moreover, rent extraction occurs only in absence of shareholder agreements, leading to the conclusion that these arrangements effectively limit the ability of the family to extract private benefits in the form of excess CEO pay.
